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Many studies show a link between social cognition, a set of cognitive and emotional
abilities applied to social situations, and executive functions in typical developing
children. Children with Down syndrome (DS) show deficits both in social cognition and
in some subcomponents of executive functions. However this link has barely been
studied in this population. The aim of this study is to investigate the links between
social cognition and executive functions among children with DS. We administered
a battery of social cognition and executive function tasks (six theory of mind tasks,
a test of emotion comprehension, and three executive function tasks) to a group
of 30 participants with DS between 4 and 12 years of age. The same tasks were
administered to a chronological-age control group and to a control group with the same
linguistic development level. Results showed that apart from deficits in social cognition
and executive function abilities, children with DS displayed a slight improvement with
increasing chronological age and language development in those abilities. Correlational
analysis suggested that working memory was the only component that remained
constant in the relation patterns of the three groups of participants, being the relation
patterns similar among participants with DS and the language development control
group. A multiple linear regression showed that working memory explained above 50%
of the variability of social cognition in DS participants and in language development
control group, whereas in the chronological-age control group this component only
explained 31% of the variability. These findings, and specifically the link between working
memory and social cognition, are discussed on the basis of their theoretical and practical
implications for children with DS. We discuss the possibility to use a working memory
training to improve social cognition in this population.
Keywords: children, Down syndrome, executive functions, social cognition, working memory
INTRODUCTION
Down syndrome (DS) is the most common genetic syndrome associated with intellectual disability
(Canfield et al., 2006). So many studies have described the pattern of relative weaknesses and
strengths in this population. Previous studies also suggest that social cognition and executive
functions are critical abilities to ensure a better quality of life for infants, children and adults, also
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with DS. However, the amount of studies about the relation
between social cognition and executive functions in DS is scant.
Social Cognition in Children with Down
Syndrome
The importance of competent social cognition abilities in
having a satisfying personal life and social interactions is
widely accepted. In this study, we understand social cognition
as a set of abilities that involve cognitive capability applied
to social situations (Harvey and Penn, 2010). Thus, this
set of abilities includes understanding mental states and
intentions in oneself and in others (or what has traditionally
been known as theory of mind), emotional recognition and
perception, and social knowledge, among others. According
to this definition, some authors have suggested that socio
cognitive abilities can be divided in two parts (Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2006; Tirapu-Ustárroz et al., 2007): a part more
connected with cognitive aspects, and another part more related
to affective aspects. On the one hand, from the cognitive
perspective, it has been considered essential to understanding
the difference between knowledge of self and others. On
the other hand, from the affective perspective, the empathic
appreciation of the emotional state of others has been considered
essential.
This study will address both aspects of social cognition.
Regarding the more cognitive aspect, we will focus on one
of the most widely studied developmental milestones -the
comprehension of explicit first-order false beliefs- as well as on
other abilities that are acquired either before or after it. As for
the more affective aspect, we will explore different dimensions
of emotional comprehension above and beyond facial expression
recognition.
Initially, as a result of studies like the one conducted by
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985), and descriptions of people with DS as
individuals who are especially friendly and interested in others,
highly sociable and with few social problems, it was postulated
that these children had no particular difficulty in theory of mind
development.
However, subsequent research has revealed such difficulties
(Binnie and Williams, 2002; Giaouri et al., 2010). For example, the
study conducted by Giaouri et al. (2010) suggested that children
with DS have difficulties in understanding false beliefs and
appearance-reality compared with typical developing children
and children with intellectual disability of unknown etiology.
Molina and Amador (2010) found that when offered the
necessary help children with DS are able to exhibit a similar
performance to that of their peers with typical development.
With regard to the more affective aspect, most studies have
focused on the recognition of facial expressions in others, this
being a necessary ability to respond appropriately in situations
requiring social interaction. Studies like the one by Wishart et al.
(2007) show that, among all aetiologies of intellectual disability,
children with DS are the only ones that exhibit a significantly
lower performance than children with typical development in
interpreting facial expressions. Previous studies reinforce this
idea regarding difficulties with emotional recognition among
children with DS (e.g., Kasari et al., 1995), some suggesting
particular difficulty in recognizing fear, surprise and anger
(Hippolyte et al., 2008). In fact, as suggested in the work
carried out by Kasari et al. (2001), it is possible that emotional
recognition among children with DS is more related to their
mental than their chronological age.
Executive Functions in Children with
Down Syndrome
For a long time, there has been a lack of clarity over
which abilities are included under the concept of executive
functions. Some authors have posited that they are higher-
order control processes, while others have defined them as
processes aimed at achieving a milestone; some have emphasized
the constructive and creative aspect, while others still have
focused on working memory. In an attempt to encompass
all these approaches, Hughes (2011) and Low and Simpson
(2012) conceptualized executive functions as an umbrella term
that includes a set of complex cognitive abilities that guide
actions aimed at a goal and adaptive responses to new or
complex situations. According with Diamond (2013), the core
components of executive functions are inhibition, working
memory, and cognitive flexibility. So, in our study, we will focus
on them.
To succeed in life and have a healthy social, cognitive and
psychological development we need to: control our attention,
thoughts, emotions or behavior (called inhibitory control),
hold information in mind and work with it (called working
memory), and based on these two skills, change spatial
and interpersonal perspectives (called cognitive flexibility). As
suggested by Pennington and Bennetto (1998), people with
DS are expected to exhibit deficits in these executive function
skills due to the fact that they have often been described as
having persistent behavior (Wilding et al., 2002). However, some
studies suggest that in children with DS, it seems that difficulties
with executive functions do not occur equally across all of
these components (Rowe et al., 2006; Kogan et al., 2009). For
example, the study by Pennington et al. (2003) only describes
difficulties in the components associated with the functioning of
the hippocampus (such as long-term visual and verbal memory).
The one conducted by Lanfranchi et al. (2009) find them in
a simultaneous task on spatial working memory but not in
one on spatial sequencing. The study conducted by Carney
et al. (2013) shows that compared with children with typical
development of the same mental age, children and adolescents
with DS have difficulty with working memory but not inhibition
and fluency.
In a developmental study by Costanzo et al. (2013)
designed to test the hypothesis of etiological specificity, different
aspects of the executive functions were evaluated in children,
adolescents and adults with DS, Williams syndrome, and a
typical development group of the same mental age. Both groups
with intellectual disabilities displayed difficulties with some
components of the executive functions, such as selective attention
and working memory, but not others, such as inhibition.
A different pattern was also found according to the etiology
of the disability, participants with DS displaying a more
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affected performance in cognitive flexibility, memory and verbal
inhibition.
Recent studies have analyzed DS executive functions by
parent and teacher reports like the Behavior Rating Inventory
of Executive Function-Preschool (BRIEF-P; Gioia et al., 2003).
On the one hand, in the study conducted by Lee et al. (2011),
caregivers of children with DS completed these report. Results
suggest a specific pattern of executive function weaknesses in this
population; working memory was the most impaired domain and
emotional control the least impaired one. On the other hand,
in the study of Daunhauer et al. (2014) were the teachers of
children with DS who completed the report. The results of this
study suggested that in the area of school function, children with
DS showed a distinct pattern of strengths and weaknesses. On
the Activity Performance domain, children with DS reported
greatest challenge on recreational movement, following social
conventions, functional communication, positive interaction, or
behavior regulation among others. On the other hand, on Task
Supports domain, children with DS reported to need more
assistance than adaptations, and that supports on cognitive-
behavioral tasks were the subdomain in which they showed
higher levels of assistance. Apart from that, it is important to
highlight that executive functions was the only predictor of
school function in this study. The idea of greater difficulty on the
cool EF suggested by these studies was also found in the work by
Lee et al. (2015).
Furthermore, some studies suggest a dissociation between
verbal and visuo-spatial abilities in children with DS (Laws, 2002;
Brock and Jarrold, 2005), because they show deficits in verbal but
not in visuo-spatial working memory abilities (Lanfranchi et al.,
2012).
So, it seems that research about executive functions indicates
the presence of a particular profile of abilities and difficulties
in DS children. Being some components more preserved (as
inhibition or visuo-spatial working memory), and others most
affected (as working memory, verbal inhibition, or cognitive
flexibility). Therefore, this second group of components could
require the design of interventions to improve it.
The Role of Executive Functions in
Social Cognition
In the pioneering study by Russell et al. (1991) on children with
typical development, a positive association was found between
performance in a false belief task and one on strategic deception
task. Although deception tasks have been considered traditionally
as a social cognition measure, in the study of Russell et al. (1991)
has been considered as an executive control task. According with
Hala and Russell (2001), children’s difficulty in this task is related
with the executive control demands, particularly with the dual
requirement to hold in mind the task rules and the inhibition of
a prepotent response of pointing directly at the treat.
Since then, several studies have confirmed the relationship
between individual differences in executive functions and
individual differences in theory of mind (Carlson and Moses,
2001; Carlson et al., 2002, 2004a,b). The nature of this
relationship is unclear. However, one of the perspectives argues
that executive functions are needed for theory of mind (Russell,
1996, 1998; Hughes and Ensor, 2007; Austin et al., 2014). So,
in this study, we will focus on the role of executive function
components in social cognition.
Of all the theory of mind abilities, the most studied in this
regard has been the understanding of false belief, which in general
terms has been positively associated with flexibility, inhibition
and working memory, but not planning.
With regard to cognitive flexibility, both correlational and
training studies show the presence of a relationship between
this component and theory of mind. Carlson and Moses (2001),
for example, found relationships between various theory of
mind tasks and a cognitive flexibility task. Specifically, Carlson
and Moses (2001) found that inhibitory task requiring a
novel response in the face of a conflicting prepotent response
significantly predicted performance in theory of mind tasks.
However, inhibitory task requiring the delay of a prepotent
response was not significant in the same analysis. Additionally,
Zelazo et al. (2002) found that a poor performance in theory of
mind tasks might be caused by a lack of ability to integrate two
contradictory rules into one system. A training study conducted
by Kloo and Perner (2003) showed that false belief training
improves performance in a card classification task that evaluates
cognitive flexibility, and vice versa.
In relation to inhibition, Hughes (1998) found a correlation
between the performance of a deception task and inhibitory
control. A year later, Perner and Lang (1999) confirmed this
relationship, and Carlson and Moses (2001) subsequently also
found a strong association between inhibition and false belief.
Further studies such as that by Carlson et al. (2002) have
confirmed this association.
Regarding working memory, Olson, Kennan and colleagues
(Gordon and Olson, 1998; Keenan et al., 1998) suggested that
the ability to hold two conflicting perspectives on the same
stimulus is a prerequisite for promoting the development of
social cognition. In line with this, Davis and Pratt (1995) found
that children under 4 did not succeed in false belief tasks
because of difficulties in working memory. Gordon and Olson
(1998) described a correlation between working memory and
an appearance-reality and a false belief task. Subsequent studies
have confirmed this relationship (Keenan et al., 1998; Hala
et al., 2003; Mutter et al., 2006) although there are also studies
that suggest the opposite (Hughes, 1998; Slade and Ruffman,
2005).
The relationship between the understanding of false belief and
the executive functions has been described for different stages
of development (Carlson et al., 2004a; Dumonthiel et al., 2010),
in longitudinal studies (Flynn, 2006; Hughes and Ensor, 2007),
when the tasks involve minimal executive demands (Perner et al.,
2002; Moses and Carlson, 2004) or in populations with atypical
development, such as autism spectrum disorders (Pellicano,
2007).
However, it is unclear which components of the executive
functions display a stronger relationship with theory of mind
abilities. Zelazo et al. (1996) examined the relationship between
social cognition and executive functions in adults with DS. They
found that performance in a set of theory of mind tasks and in
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a card sort task was positively correlated when mental age was
controlled. However, we do not know more studies or results in
infants or children with DS.
Therefore, the aim of this study is to take a more in-depth look
at this relationship in children with DS. We want to investigate
the role of executive functions in social cognition among children
with DS and compare this relationship with the one described for
children with typical development of the same chronological age
and a similar level of linguistic development (LD). In addressing
this aim we will be analyzing the social cognition and executive
function abilities of children with DS in depth and will focus on
how these abilities evolve with increasing chronological age and
language development.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 90 participants (aged 2;9 – 12;2) took part in the
study, divided into three groups of 30 participants: one group of
children with a medical diagnosis of DS, and two control groups
composed of children with typical development; one with the
same chronological age as the participants with DS (CA), and a
second with the same level of LD. Children with other associated
difficulties were excluded from the study.
As shown in Table 1, the CA group participants had the
same chronological age and gender distribution as the DS group
participants. According to the T-test, the age of these two groups
was statistically higher than that of the LD group participants
(p < 0.0005), while the LD group participants had a similar level
of language development (±4 months) to that of the DS group
participants (the gender variable was not taken into account in
the construction of this control group). The T-test shows that
the language level of the CA group participants was statistically
higher than that of the DS and LD groups (p< 0.0005).
Tasks
In this paper, we evaluate two aspects of participants’ cognitive
functioning: social cognition and the executive functions. Below,
we detail the tasks used to evaluate each of these aspects.
Social Cognition Tasks
To evaluate social cognition, we used six tasks that have been
traditionally used to evaluate theory of mind, and one test of
emotional understanding.
We divided the theory of mind evaluation tasks into
three levels of difficulty according to their distance from the
understanding of first-order false beliefs, and we included two
tasks in each level. Apart from that, a pilot study with DS children
was conducted to ensure that participants understood the tasks
(Amadó et al., 2012). We designed visual and verbal aids to
compensate comprehension difficulties detected.
In Level 1, we used two tasks to evaluate abilities developed
by children with typical development prior to the first-order false
belief. We administered an adaptation of the task Diverse Beliefs
designed by Wellman and Liu (2004) and an adaptation of the
task Seeing is knowing developed by Pratt and Bryant (1990). In
the Diverse Beliefs task children had to predict the behavior of
the story character according to the beliefs of the character. It is
important to know that the character always had a belief contrary
to child’s. In the Seeing is Knowing task, we evaluated the capacity
of the child to understand the relationship between seeing (or not
seeing) the content of a closed box and knowing what object was
inside the box. In both tasks, we used pictures to tell the story and
facilitate their understanding. The score for each of these tasks
was one point, meaning the highest score at this level was two
points. In order to make the score at this level equivalent with the
scores in other theory of mind levels, we doubled the total score
for Level 1.
In Level 2, we included first-order false belief tasks. Thus,
we administered the Unexpected Content task, based on the
procedure designed by Gopnik and Astington (1988), and the
Change of Location task, designed by Wimmer and Perner (1983).
In the Unexpected Content task, we used a tube of Smarties R©
with rocks inside. After exploring the tube, we showed its real
content to the child. Then we asked them what they thought
there was inside the tube before opening it, and what their friend
would think the tube contained without seeing the real content.
In the Change of Location task the child had to predict, in a story
represented with small dolls, the behavior of a character when the
character held a false belief about the location of a hidden object.
Each of the Level 2 tasks was awarded two points, meaning the
highest score for this level was four points.
At Level 3, we used tasks which according to developmental
research are successfully completed after the first-order false
belief. Specifically, we used an adaptation of the Deception
task designed by Sodian (1991) and a Second-Order Change
of Location task based on the procedure devised by Sullivan
et al. (1994). The Second-order Change of Location followed a
procedure similar to that described in the first-order false belief
TABLE 1 | Characteristics (sex, age, language, and IQ) of each group of participants.
Age Languagea IQb
Group n Girls (f) Range M (SD) Range M (SD) Percentile≤ 25 M (SD)
DS 30 18 4;0–12;2 8.54 (2.36) 1;8–8;6 4.49 (1.69) 90% 14.37 (3.45)
CA 30 18 4;0–12;2 8.54 (2.36) 3;5–14;5 8.81 (2.86) 0% 27.90 (9.61)
LD 30 16 2;9–9;1 4.52 (1.64) 2;1–8;3 4.53 (1.48) 0% 16.63 (5.19)
aLanguage development was calculated using the score obtained in the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test or PPVT (Dunn et al., 2006); bThe IQ score was obtained via
administration of the Raven Progressive Matrices (Raven et al., 1996).
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task. However, in this story the child had to predict the behavior
of a character involved in a second order recursivity situation. In
theDeception task the child played a game, with the puppets of the
Little Red Ridding Hood and the Wolf, where the player getting
more stars was the winner. To win stars the child had to help Little
Red Ridding Hood (who gave the stars to the chid whenever she
found one) and had to deceive the Wolf (who kept the stars for
himself). Each of the tasks was awarded two points, meaning the
highest score for this level was four also points.
Finally, in order to evaluate emotional understanding, we
administered an adaptation of the Emotional Comprehension
Test by Albanese and Molina (2008). Of the nine components
included in the original version of this instrument, we
administered six, selected on the basis of results from the study
by Pons et al. (2004): recognition (I), external causes (II), desires
(III), beliefs (IV), memory (V), and hidden emotions (VII). In the
administration of each component, we followed the instructions
of the original test. Also following the instructions in the manual,
each component that was passed scored one point, meaning the
maximum score in this task was six points.
In all of our analyses in the results section, we consider
scores from the theory of mind and emotional understanding
tasks together, giving a maximum score of 18 points for social
cognition.
Executive Function Tasks
In accordance with the results presented in the study by Miyake
et al. (2000), in this study, we used different tasks to evaluate three
of the components of the executive functions: working memory,
inhibition, and cognitive flexibility.
To evaluate working memory, we administered a version of
the visual-spatial memory task used by Lanfranchi et al. (2004),
which we called the Frog Task. This entailed administering
a total of eight tests (and two trial tests) divided into four
levels of difficulty, in which the child had to follow two rules
simultaneously. In this task, we used a frog and a board with
squares. The frog jumped from one square to another. The child
had to remember the frog starting position on the board (first
rule) and to hit the table with the hand when the frog jumped
into a red square (second rule). Each test was awarded one point
only if the participant completed the game successfully; meaning
the maximum score for the task was eight points.
To evaluate inhibition, we used a simplified version of the
Stroop test, the Day-Night Task (Gerstadt et al., 1994). After two
trial tests, we administered 16 tests in random order in which
the participant had to inhibit their predominant response to
a visual stimulus. We designed a Power Point presentation in
which two images (a sun and a moon) appeared randomly. When
the child saw the sun they had to say “night” (inhibiting the
predominant response, “day”), and when the moon appeared in
the screen the child had to say “day” (inhibiting the predominant
response, “night”). One point was awarded for each correct
answer, meaning the maximum score for the task was 16 points.
Finally, we evaluated cognitive flexibility by means of an
adapted version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test developed by
Fisher and Happé (2005), which comprises a card classification
game using different shapes (triangle, round, square), colors
(red, blue, yellow), and numbers (1, 2, 3). The experimenter
put in front of the child, three stimulus cards to define the
three categories where to classify the response cards. Then,
the experimenter gave to the child each of the response cards
and asked them to classify each card in the correct category.
In accordance with the hidden classification rule governing
the game in each part (color, shape, number, and color), the
experimenter gave feedback to the child (correct or incorrect
classification). The child had to discover the classification rules
during the game. Following the recommendations of these
authors, we used the number of completed dimensions (unaided)
as a measure of overall success in this task. Therefore, the
maximum score in this task was four points (classification
criteria: color, shape, number, and color).
For a more detailed description of the procedure of the tasks
used, see the appendix of the study conducted by Amadó et al.
(2012).
Procedure
We contacted the DS participants through various organizations
dedicated to the care of people with this etiology of intellectual
disability. Participants in the CA and LD groups were selected
according to their chronological age, gender, and language
development from different schools in provinces of Catalonia
(Spain).
In all three groups, the parents/legal guardians were first
duly informed of the purpose and requirements of the
study by means of an explanatory letter requesting consent
for their son/daughter’s participation. We then carried out
between two and four individual sessions (at the school,
foundation/association or child’s family home) in order to
administer the tasks. The amount of time spent administering
each of the tasks varied from one participant to another, but
the order of administration was always the same: vocabulary,
intelligence, executive functions (working memory, inhibition,
and cognitive flexibility), and social cognition (emotional
understanding, theory of mind tasks according to their order of
difficulty).
In some analysis, participants with DS will be divided into
different subgroups. According with their chronological age, we
will distinguish between 3 subgroups with 10 participants in each
group: the younger group (4;0 – 6;11), the middle group (7;0 –
9;11), and the older group (10;0 – 12;11). According with their
level of language development (based on the score obtained in
the PPVT by Dunn et al., 2006), we will stablish 2 groups with 15
participants in each group: low LD group (0;0 – 4;0) and high LD
group (4;1 – 8;12).
RESULTS
As Table 2 shows, the DS group participants scored significantly
lower than the children with typical development in both control
groups (CA and LD) in all of the administered tasks.
As Table 2 shows, participants of the CA group obtained
higher scores in all the tasks, followed by the participants of the
LD group and the participants with DS, in this order.
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TABLE 2 | Means (standard deviations) in the social cognition and executive function tasks in each group of participants.
DS CA LD Contrastse Cohen’s df
4.24
Social Cognitiona 5.70 (3.94) 17.07 (2.05) 9.87 (5.78) DS < CA∗∗∗/DS < LD∗∗ −0.91
2.14
−3.14
Executive Functions WMb 2.47 (2.43) 7.20 (1.03) 4.57 (2.21) DS < CA∗∗∗/DS < LD∗∗ −0.92
1.85
−1.94
INHc 10.90 (5.12) 15.83 (0.46) 14.30 (2.32) DS < CA∗∗∗/DS < LD∗∗ −1.04
1.27
−4.08
FLEXd 1.43 (1.10) 3.90 (0.31) 2.57 (1.33) DS < CA∗∗∗/DS < LD∗∗ −0.96
1.89
aSocial Cognition (range: 0–18); b M, working memory (range: 0–8); c INH, inhibition (range: 0–16); dFLEX, cognitive flexibility (range: 0–4); eContrasts were identified using
the T-test. ∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; t.s. when p > 0.05; and n.s. when p > 1. fThe values of Cohen’s d are presented in this order: DS-CA, DS-LD, and
CA-LD.
TABLE 3 | Means (standard deviations) in the social cognition and executive function tasks in each group of participants with Down syndrome.
M (SD)a Social cognitionb Executive functions
WMc INHd FLEXe
Chronological age groups 5.73 (0.84) (A) 2.80 (2.44) 0.70 (1.25) 9 (5.44) 0.90 (0.32)
8.85 (0.85) (B) 5.10 (2.28) 2.30 (1.95) 10.20 (5.81) 1 (0)
11.05 (0.78) (C) 9.20 (3.94) 4.40 (2.46) 13.50 (2.99) 2.40 (1.51)
Linguistic development groups 3.12 (0.67) (D) 3.67 (2.64) 1.20 (1.47) 8.67 (5.47) 0.93 (0.26)
5.85 (1.21) (E) 7.73 (4.04) 3.37 (2.58) 13.13 (3.68) 1.93 (1.39)
Contrastsf A-B A < B∗
A-C A < C∗∗ A < C∗∗∗ A < C∗
B-C B < C∗ B < C∗
D-E D < E∗∗ D < E∗∗ D < E∗∗ D < E∗
aMeans (and standard deviations) of chronological age and linguistic age (calculated using the score obtained in the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test or PPVT by Dunn
et al., 2006) of the DS groups; bSocial Cognition (range: 0–18); cWM, working memory (range: 0–8); d INH, inhibition (range: 0–16); eFLEX, cognitive flexibility (range: 0–4);
fContrasts were identified using the T-test. ∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; t.s. when p > 0.05; and n.s. when p > 1.
As T-test shows, the mean score of participants with
typical development was significantly better than the mean
score of participants with DS in all the tasks. According
with Cohen (1988), the effect sizes of all these comparisons
are large. Also it’s important to consider that, in all the
tasks, the largest effects are observed between DS and CA
participants.
However, it is interesting to analyze performance in these tasks
with increased chronological age and language development in
DS children. On the one hand, to test the effect of chronological
age we divided participants with DS into three groups: the
younger group (4;0 – 6;11), the middle group (7;0 – 9;11), and
the older group (10;0 – 12;11). On the other hand, to test the
effect of linguistic level, we divided participants with DS into two
groups based on the score obtained in the PPVT (Dunn et al.,
2006): low LD group (0;0 – 4;0) and high LD group (4;1 – 8;12).
The mean scores for the chronological age and linguistic level
groups into which, we divided the participants with DS are shown
in Table 3.
As the above table shows, both chronological age and LD
were relevant factors in mastering social cognition in participants
with DS. Thus, as the chronological age and linguistic level of
this group of children increased, their social cognition abilities
improved, with significant differences observed in the group of
participants with older chronological age and both linguistic level
groups.
With regard to the executive functions, we saw that
performance in the tasks of working memory and cognitive
flexibility also improved with both chronological age and LD
of participants with DS. Therefore, these two developmental
factors were also relevant to mastering these two components
of the executive functions. Specifically, we observed a significant
improvement in working memory in the younger chronological
age group and the two linguistic level groups, and a significant
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TABLE 4 | Correlations between social cognition and executive function
components for each group of participants.
Social
cognition
Executive functions
WM INH FLEX
Social cognition − 0.738∗∗∗ 0.428∗ 0.562∗∗
0.581∗∗ 0.195 −0.154
0.800∗∗∗ 0.319 0.669∗∗∗
Executive functions WM − 0.478∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗
0.363 −0.154
0.268 0.791∗∗∗
INH − 0.289
0.123
0.479∗∗∗
FLEX −
The values in the table are Pearson correlation coefficients (r) and its significance
(∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; t.s. when p > 0.05; and n.s. when p > 1).
The correlations appear in this order on the table: DS, CA, and LD.
improvement in flexibility in the older age group and the
two LD groups. In contrast, in the inhibition task, we only
observed a significant improvement in the two linguistic level
groups into which, we divided the participants with DS.
With inhibition, it seems that chronological age was not an
important factor, and in fact, the scores obtained by all three
age groups for this task were very close to the maximum
score.
Table 4 below illustrates the patterns of relationship between
social cognition and the executive functions for each of the
groups participating in this study. To graduate the intensity of a
correlation, we used the criteria described by Bisquerra (2004):
r = 1 perfect correlation, 0.8 < r < 1 very high correlation,
0.6< r< 0.8 high correlation, 0.4< r< 0.6 moderate correlation,
0.2 < r < 0.4 low correlation, 0 < r < 0.2 very low correlation,
and r = 0 no correlation.
In the DS group there was a significant correlation between
social cognition and all components of the executive functions
evaluated. The strongest correlation was with working memory,
this being both positive and high. The correlation with
components of cognitive flexibility and inhibition was also
positive but moderate. Similarly, in the LD group social cognition
displayed a significant, positive and high correlation with both
working memory and flexibility. In contrast, in the CA group a
significant correlation was only found between social cognition
and working memory, this being positive and moderate. It is
therefore interesting to point out that working memory was
the only component of the executive functions that remained
constant in the relationship patterns of the three groups of
participants.
It is worth noting that, as the above table shows, internal
correlations between the different components of the executive
functions followed different patterns in groups. The CA group is
the one which displayed most divergence in relation to the other
two, without significant correlations between executive function
components. On the other hand, in DS and LD groups, working
memory correlates with cognitive flexibility.
To evaluate the predictive capacity of each executive
component, we conducted a multiple linear regression model
(independent/predictive variable: score in working memory,
inhibition, and cognitive flexibility; dependent variable: total
score in social cognitive abilities). The results of the multiple
linear regressions (using the enter method of the SPSS) pointed
in the same direction, as for all three groups the regression model
only included working memory as a predictive variable of score in
social cognition. However, it is interesting to note that although
the predictive variable of social cognition is the same for all three
groups, the percentage of variance in social cognition that this
component of the executive functions was able to explain was not
the same. In the DS and LD groups, the model which includes
only the significant predictors (constant and working memory)
explained above 50% of the variability, whereas in the CA group
this component of the executive functions only explained 30% of
the variability (see Table 5).
Although this is not the aim of the present work, we have
used the same procedure to analyze the predictive capacity of
social cognition on each component of executive functions (note
that this multiple linear regression includes only one predictive
variable). As Table 6 shows, in the DS group, social cognition was
significant to predict all the components of executive functions
assessed, explaining above 50% of working memoyr, 30% of
cognitive flexibility, and 15% of inhibition. In a similar pattern,
in the LD group, social cognition is a significant predictor for
working memory (explaining above 60%) and cognitive flexibility
(explaining above 40%). And finally, in the CA group, social
cognition only predicts above 30% of working memory.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to investigate the role of executive
functions in social cognition among children with DS and
compare it with that described for children with typical
development of the same linguistic level and chronological age.
We will first discuss the results that children with DS obtained for
social cognition and the executive functions in the administered
tasks, as well as their evolution by chronological age and language
development. We will then discuss the role of executive functions
in social cognition and comment briefly the relationship in
reverse.
Previous studies have reported difficulties in social cognition
among children with DS, both from the cognitive aspect (e.g.,
Binnie and Williams, 2002; Giaouri et al., 2010) and the emotional
aspect (e.g., Kasari et al., 1995; Wishart et al., 2007). The results of
our study point in the same direction, showing that participants
with DS have deficits in all aspects of social cognition that, we
evaluated. We would also add, in line with the findings of Kasari
et al. (2001), that these difficulties, although remaining present,
are not as severe when mental age (or level of LD) is taken into
account.
As for mastery of the executive functions, the results
of our study on children with DS were also in line with
those suggested by previous research, in particular the fact
that the different components of the executive functions are
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TABLE 5 | Multiple linear regression models of social cognition for each group of participants.
Predictive
variables
Standardised beta
coefficients
t (p) Predictive models
Adjusted R2 F (1, 28) p
DS Constant – 1.334 (0.194) 0.529 33.585 0.000
WMa 0.592 3.228 (0.003)
INHb 0.101 0.684 (0.500)
FLEXc 0.153 0.909 (0.372)
CA Constant – 0.942 (0.355) 0.314 14.274 0.001
WMa 0.573 3.278 (0.003)
INHb −0.005 −0.030 (0.976)
FLEXc −0.066 −0.401 (0.692)
LD Constant – −0.711 (0.484) 0.628 49.875 0.000
WMa 0.755 3.914 (0.001)
INHb 0.106 0.790 (0.437)
FLEXc 0.021 0.099 (0.922)
aWM, working memory; b INH, inhibition; cFLEX, cognitive flexibility. The predictive models described in this table include only the significant predictors.
TABLE 6 | Multiple linear regression models of working memory, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility for each group of participants.
Dependent
variables
Predictive
variables
Standardised beta
coefficients
t (p) Predictive models
Adjusted R2 F (1, 28) p
DS WMa Constant – −0.241 (0.811) 0.529 33.585 0.000
SCd 0.738 5.795 (0.000)
INHb Constant – 5.061 (0.000) 0.154 6.275 0.018
SCd 0.428 2.505 (0.018)
FLEXc Constant – 1.775 (0.087) 0.291 12.914 0.001
SCd 0.562 3.594 (0.001)
CA WMa Constant – 1.667 (0.107) 0.314 14.274 0.001
SCd 0.581 3.778 (0.001)
INHb Constant – 21.053 (0.000) – – –
SCd 0.195 1.050 (0.303)
FLEXc Constant – 8.987 (0.000) – – –
SCd –0.154 −0.827 (0.415)
LD WMa Constant – 3.149 (0.004) 0.628 49.875 0.000
SCd 0.800 7.062 (0.000)
INHb Constant – 15.919 (0.000) – – –
SCd 0.319 1.781 (0.086)
FLEXc Constant – 2.845 (0.008) 0.428 22.671 0.000
SCd 0.669 4.761 (0.000)
aWM, working memory; b INH, inhibition; cFLEX, cognitive flexibility; dSC, social cognition. The predictive models are described only in the components in which social
cognition is a significant predictor.
affected unequally (e.g., Rowe et al., 2006). In our study,
participants with DS displayed less alteration in the component
of inhibition, especially when language ability was taken into
account. This relative preservation of inhibition compared to
the other components of executive functioning has also been
described in research by Carney et al. (2013) on children and
adolescents with intellectual disability, and in the study by
Costanzo et al. (2013) on adolescents and adults with DS and
Williams syndrome. Furthermore, in the latter study participants
with DS showed a greater alteration in the components of
flexibility and working memory when compared with children
with Williams syndrome. Danielsson et al. (2012) found that
adults with intellectual disabilities have difficulties in working
memory and accessing lexical items, but not in inhibition. So
it would seem that this tendency continues in later stages of
development.
Beyond the difficulties described in the two aspects of
social cognition and the different components of the executive
functions, the results of this study suggest that, at the ages
studied at least, children with DS experience improvements in
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these abilities with increased chronological age and language
development. Lee et al. (2015) found that inhibition is the only
component of executive functions that improve with age in a
sample of 85 youth with DS. However it is important to consider
that this study assess executive functions by a report completed
by parents. Molina and Amador (2010) concluded that despite
the described difficulties in social cognition, when a group of
children with DS were offered the necessary assistance they
improved and exhibited a similar performance to that of their
peers with typical development. We believe that the improvement
described in participants with DS in our study supports this
finding. Thus, contrary to the stagnation that has sometimes
been suggested in both individuals with DS and other forms
of intellectual disability, social cognition and executive function
abilities improve with development, at least in the group that
we have studied. However, in order to verify the presence of
this improvement with increasing age in participants with DS,
we would need to conduct a longitudinal study, like the one
conducted by Lee et al. (2015). Our study has not a longitudinal
nature. Therefore, we can only conclude that older children
with DS performed better than young children with DS, because
we cannot discard that older participants had better executive
function abilities in early ages.
With regard to the role of executive functions in social
cognition, we should first take a moment to discuss the
relationship between the various components of the executive
functions. Miyake et al. (2000) suggested that in the beginning
of their development, executive functions may be grouped under
the same domain and no differentiation is made between them.
According with these authors, as development progresses, these
functions can be grouped into more specialized and separated
components. The results of our study could be seen to agree
with this, because in participants with DS and peers of the
same linguistic level, both at a lower developmental level
than the control group by age, there was a high correlation
between most of the executive function components evaluated.
In the control group by age, however, which had a higher
level of development than the above groups, the correlation
between the different executive function components was non-
existent. Therefore, we believe that at this age the different
executive function components have become specialized, which
is why the correlational analysis presented them as independent
components.
Above and beyond discussion of the relationship between the
different components of the executive functions, the main aim of
this study was to analyze the role of executive functions in social
cognition abilities in DS children.
In all three of the study groups, a relationship was found
between social cognition and working memory, as described in
previous studies on children with typical development (Hala
et al., 2003; Mutter et al., 2006). Surprisingly, and unlike the
findings of previous studies such as that by Carlson and Moses
(2001) or Carlson et al. (2002), the components of cognitive
flexibility and inhibition did not display any relationship with the
social cognition abilities of participants in the control group by
chronological age. However, a relationship was found between
social cognition and cognitive flexibility in the other two groups
and between social cognition and inhibition in the group of
children with DS. It is worth noting that participants in the
age control group obtained very close to maximum scores in
all the tasks, and the lack of a relationship between these
components and social cognition could therefore be caused
by this ceiling effect. As the results show, participants with
typical development of the age-matched control group obtained
a score near the ceiling on social cognition, working memory,
inhibition, and cognitive flexibility tasks. Perhaps, this ceiling
effect is hiding major or subtle differences between groups. So,
the results of this study need to be corroborated in future works
using more appropriate instruments or tasks to evaluate social
cognition and executive functions in typically developing and DS
children.
With regard to the pattern of relationships between social
cognition and the executive functions it’s important to refer
the study conducted by Zelazo et al. (1996) in adults with DS.
They found that theory of mind was correlated with cognitive
flexibility. However, we have no previous studies conducted in
children with DS with which to compare it at the present time.
What, we can state, however, is firstly that the relationship
established between social cognition and the executive functions
in populations with typical development is also extended to
children with DS, and secondly that the relationship pattern
described in individuals with DS is similar to that displayed by
their peers with typical development with similar linguistic skills.
We might therefore consider working memory, being the
only component of the executive functions in our study
to display a relationship with social cognition in all three
groups of participants, to be an essential element in improving
social cognition in children with both typical and atypical
development. The nature of our study is correlational. So, we
can not conclude, from our results, the presence of a causal
relationship between working memory and social cognition
abilities. However, our results added to the ones of other studies,
point to this direction. For example, Hughes (1998) described
a correlation between the understanding of false belief and
working memory, the relationship remaining with age and when
controlling for verbal ability (Davis and Pratt, 1995; Keenan,
1998). Though other studies, such as that by Slade and Ruffman
(2005) did not find that working memory facilitated subsequent
understanding of false belief in a group of children aged three to
four.
Regarding the predictive capacity of working memory on
theory of mind, we only know of one study that supports this
hypothesis, that conducted by Davis and Pratt (1995). Said study,
using a multiple linear regression analysis on children aged
between three and five, showed that working memory predicts
performance in a false belief task, even when controlling for
age and vocabulary. Nevertheless, the authors themselves say
that success in working memory is a necessary requirement for
competent performance in theory of mind.
We have also explored the opposite direction of this
relationship: the role of social cognition in each component of
executive functions. Our results show that social cognition is a
predictive variable for working memory in all the groups, and
also for other executive components in children with DS and
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their peers with a similar LD. However, we must be cautious with
these results because a recent meta-analysis conducted by Devine
and Hughes (2014) found an asymmetrical pattern of relationship
between social cognition and executive functions; early executive
functions predict later variation in false belief understanding
more strongly than vice versa.
According with Diamond (2013), we have enough empirical
evidence to say that executive functions can be improved at
any age across the life cycle. More specifically, training studies
like that conducted by Klingberg et al. (2005) on children with
attention difficulties, but also others conducted on children with
typical development, suggest that the component of working
memory can be trained. However, according to Shipstead et al.
(2012), the aforementioned training studies displayed many
shortcomings and a definitive demonstration of the possibility
of improving working memory through training was therefore
still required. In response to this debate, the meta-analysis
conducted by Melby-Lervå and Hulme (2013) showed that
working memory training produces only short-term effects and
cannot be extrapolated to work with other cognitive abilities.
However, in this same study the authors observed, through the
analysis of a small and surely insufficient number of studies, that
in visuospatial working memory the effects of training can last
for up to 5 months. More recent studies report specific data
about the possibility to train working memory in individuals
with DS. For example, the study by Costa et al. (2015) showed
that two adolescents with DS improved their performance
in some (trained and non-trained) working memory tasks,
specifically in visuo-spatial working memory tasks, after a six-
week school-based intervention. In the same direction, Pulina
et al. (2015) found that thirty-nine children and adolescents
with DS improved their performance in the spatial-simultaneous
component of working memory after a training administered
individually (by parents or experts) during a month. It is worth
noting that these improvements were maintained after a month
in both groups.
Aside from the results suggested by training studies, and given
that cognitive flexibility is also found to be related to working
memory in children with DS and their peers of the same linguistic
level, we might consider it to be another important element
in improving social cognition. This was demonstrated by the
findings of Fisher and Happé (2005) in research where training in
the executive functions (based on cognitive flexibility) was found
to be useful in improving the understanding of false belief in
children with autistic disorders.
Working memory or cognitive flexibility training could be an
open window for improving social cognition in this population.
However, with the research available to us today, we can state
that the effects of working memory training (or that of other
components of the executive functions) on the understanding
of false beliefs are not clear, and even less so when applied to
social cognition. It is for this reason that, taking into account the
contributions by Diamond (2012) regarding repeated practice as
a key element in the success of executive function training and the
greater benefit of this to children with poorer executive functions,
we believe it necessary and useful to continue to explore this
relationship in these populations.
In the future, this line of inquiry could provide the key to
promote the cognitive domains of social cognition and executive
functions in children with DS. But also, and more importantly,
could provide the key to ensure higher levels of inclusion in
society and a best quality of life for people with DS.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this study was to investigate the role of the executive
functions in social cognition among children with DS and
compare it with that of their peers with typical development.
Apart from one study of adults with DS, we do not know of
any previous studies that have addressed this question in this
population, and neither have, we found many studies comparing
the performance of children with DS and that of their peers with
typical development of the same linguistic level.
The results of our study show that, in line with the findings
of previous studies, participants with DS underperformed in
comparison with their peers with typical development, both
in terms of social cognition and the executive functions. The
most interesting finding is that the predictive role of executive
funcitons in social cognition described in children with DS is
similar to that exhibited by their peers with typical development
with the same language skills. The results of this study confirm
the importance of the different components of the executive
functions in this relationship and highlight the central role of
working memory. Moreover, they suggest that the executive
functions may be displayed as undifferentiated in early stages of
development.
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